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Nationwide, AFDC caseloads have decreased by about 18 percent since March 1994, while some
states, such as Wisconsin, Indiana, and Oregon, have seen declines of 40 percent or more. Two factors
are frequently suggested as possible causes: state-level experiments with welfare reform and strong
economic growth. In this paper, we use state-level monthly panel data from 1987 to 1996 to assess the
importance of each of these factors by estimating a model of AFDC caseloads as a dynamic function of
time-dependent state welfare reform variables (welfare waivers) and economic variables such as per
capita employment. Our results from the dynamic model suggest that the decline in per capita AFDC
caseloads is attributable largely to the economic growth of states and not to waivers from federal welfare
policies. In the 26 states experiencing at least a 20 percent decline in per capita AFDC caseloads between
1993 and 1996, we attribute 78 percent of the decline to business-cycle factors and 6 percent to welfare
waivers.Accounting for the Decline in AFDC Caseloads:
Welfare Reform or Economic Growth?
1. INTRODUCTION
The dramatic recent decline in the number of families receiving Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) has captured substantial attention in the popular press (e.g., DeParle, 1997; Harris and
Havemann, 1997; Milbank and Georges, 1997). Nationwide, AFDC caseloads have decreased by about
18 percent since March of 1994, while some states, such as Wisconsin, Indiana, and Oregon, have seen
declines of 40 percent or more. Two factors are frequently suggested as possible causes: state-level
experiments with welfare reform and strong economic growth. Accounting for the relative importance of
welfare reform and economic growth on AFDC caseloads may foreshadow the potential impact of the
recent federal changes in welfare policy resulting from the 1996 passage of the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act. In this paper, we use state-level monthly panel data to assess
the importance of each of these factors by estimating a model of AFDC caseloads as a dynamic function
of time-dependent state welfare reform variables (welfare waivers) and economic variables such as per
capita employment. Using a variety of empirical specifications, we conclude that although welfare reform
has had a modest effect on caseloads, a much larger fraction of the decline is a result of the strength of
the economy.
Although it is too soon to expect the new federal restrictions to have visible consequences, many
states have experimented for several years with programs that entail similar restrictions under waivers
from federal rules governing the AFDC program. For example, Wisconsin received a waiver in
November 1993 for its Work Not Welfare demonstration project that imposed both work requirements
and time limits on the receipt of AFDC benefits in the affected counties. Meanwhile, the first major
waiver for Oregon was approved in July 1992, which expanded work requirements and limited
exemptions from the JOBS Program. Subsequent federal waivers have allowed Oregon to further2
See Congressional Budget Office (1993) for a complete list of these studies. See, also, the related work in
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Friedlander and Burtless (1995), Gueron and Pauly (1991), and Moffitt (1996).
strengthen work requirements and have added time limits and subsidized private sector jobs as well as
expanded the availability of child care subsidies, placement assistance, and health insurance to former
recipients. Indeed, given the breadth of the state-specific waivers, many states’ welfare programs will
remain substantially unchanged after implementation of the new federal welfare reform (Blank, 1997a).
Weighing the relative merits of stringent reforms as opposed to economic stimulus as
mechanisms to reduce welfare dependency is crucial to evaluating welfare reform. Perhaps surprisingly,
few attempts have been made to examine the link between welfare waivers and caseloads. Recently, the
U.S. Council of Economic Advisers (1997) employed annual state-level panel data for 1976–1996 to
model per capita AFDC recipiency rates as a function of current and one-period lagged unemployment
rates and a variety of welfare-waiver dummy variables, while also controlling for AFDC maximum
benefit guarantees and unobserved state fixed and time-varying effects. In its preferred estimates, the
CEA concludes that economic growth accounts for 44 percent of the decline in AFDC caseloads from
1993 to 1996, while welfare waivers account for 31 percent of the decline. Blank (1997b) also uses
annual state-level panel data on AFDC caseloads for 1979–1995. While Blank’s primary focus is on
explaining the unexpected run-up in AFDC caseloads from 1990 to 1993, she also finds that both the
macroeconomy and welfare waivers have had a significant effect on caseload declines. However, Blank
also presents evidence that waivers are proxying for “a whole set of changes that occurred in states where
waivers were implemented” (p.19). Although Blank’s model and data do not permit her to separate these
effects, she concludes that waivers are not the primary determinant of changes in caseload levels.
A few previous papers have considered the impact of economic stimuli on caseload levels
without examining the concurrent effects of welfare reform.  The purpose of most of these studies has
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been to develop models that can accurately forecast changes in the number of families receiving AFDC3
over time. Not surprisingly given their purpose, they tend to use time series data and focus on a single
state, and in some cases on a single city (New York). Most of these models find that as labor market
opportunities improve, the aggregate caseload declines.
Hoynes (1996), using microlevel data on individual case duration, finds strong evidence that
labor market conditions affect welfare spell duration. While Hoynes’s results are compelling, her data do
not permit her to explore the potential effects of the current round of welfare reform. To our knowledge,
no microlevel data on welfare spell duration exist that are current enough to evaluate the effects of the
recent welfare waivers and economic growth, which are of central interest in this study. However,
Hoynes’s work underscores the importance of controlling for both observed and unobserved cross-
sectional heterogeneity.
Unlike the aforementioned studies by the CEA (1997) and Blank (1997b), we use monthly state-
level data on per capita AFDC caseloads from 1987 to 1996. We show that the use of annual caseloads
masks important short-run dynamics in caseload levels that can more adequately be captured with
monthly data. Moreover, because many state welfare waivers were not granted until as recently as 1996,
the use of annual data will miss the dynamic adjustment to the reforms. The monthly frequency also
alleviates potential bias arising from two sources: the aggregation bias in the annual data resulting from
the fact that AFDC eligibility is determined monthly (Hoynes 1996), and, most important, the difficulty
of controlling for the lag between the date of approval and the implementation of the waiver provisions
with annual data.
We use the monthly unemployment rate and per capita employment interchangeably to measure
economic growth, while we categorize welfare waivers into four components: work requirements, time
limits, making work more attractive, and parental responsibility. We estimate both static and dynamic
models that control for a cubic trend in caseloads along with state-specific fixed and time-varying effects,
in addition to economic growth and welfare waivers. The inclusion of time-varying, state-specific effects4
Using a vector autoregression with monthly data, Blank (1997b) also contends that the monthly
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employment-caseload relationship follows a highly dynamic process. This portion of her analysis does not consider
the effects of welfare reform.
Our preference would have been to use county-level caseloads, so that we could capture intrastate
3
variation in economic fluctuations. However, to our knowledge these data do not exist in a centralized format for
years after 1992.
controls for other variables that are likely to affect caseloads, including changes in both policy and
demographic variables. Our dynamic model allows for considerable path-dependence in caseload changes
from month to month and also describes the ways in which employment changes over time affect
subsequent caseload changes.  We are also able to explore the lags between welfare waiver approval and
2
the actual implementation of the waivers in ways that previous studies have not been able to do because
of their use of static models and annual data.
Our results from the dynamic model suggest that the decline in per capita AFDC caseloads is
attributable largely to the economic growth of states and not to waivers from federal welfare policies. For
example, in Wisconsin, the state with the largest caseload reduction from 1993 to 1996, we attribute only
11 percent of the decline to welfare waivers but 53 percent to business-cycle factors. In the 26 states
experiencing at least a 20 percent decline in per capita AFDC caseloads, we attribute 78 percent of the
decline to business-cycle factors and 6 percent to welfare waivers.
2. DATA AND ESTIMATION ISSUES
The data used in the empirical analysis come from four sources. First, we collect state-specific
monthly AFDC caseload data for the 1987–1996 federal fiscal years (October 1986 to September 1996)
from Quarterly Public Assistance Statistics, published by the Office of Family Assistance of the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).  Using AFDC caseloads as the dependent variable is
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preferable to the number of AFDC recipients for two reasons. First, number of recipients confounds the
number of households receiving AFDC with the within-household fertility behavior. In addition, the5
It is possible that monthly employment and caseload data are more noisy than annual data. However, we
4
believe that the benefits of being able to avoid the aggregation bias in annual caseloads, given that AFDC eligibility
is determined monthly, and of being able to capture the lag between waiver approval and implementation, given how
recently most states’s waivers have been approved, outweigh the possible noise in the high-frequency data.
Our results are qualitatively the same when we do not deflate caseloads by state population.
5
statistic that has received the most press and political attention lately is the number of cases, rather than
the number of persons per case.
We download state-specific monthly employment levels and unemployment rates from the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics Most Requested Series Web page.  It is not obvious which measure is better at
4
capturing the effect of the business cycle on caseloads. However, Hoynes (1996) argues that
unemployment rates confound movements in labor supply and demand while employment better captures
demand conditions. This, of course, rests on the assumption that workers are off of their notional labor
supply curves, making employment demand-determined. For robustness purposes, we estimate models
using each measure interchangeably.
To adjust caseloads and employment levels to reflect differing state populations, we download
annual population figures from the U.S. Census Bureau’s State Population Estimates Web page.
Although caseloads and employment are observed at monthly frequencies, versus annual frequencies for
population, we deflate caseloads and employment by year-specific population under the assumption that
it is cross-sectional differences rather than time-series differences in population that are likely to affect
caseloads and employment.
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We rely primarily on information from the HHS Web site for the approval dates and types of
welfare waivers in each state (HHS, 1996a). HHS classifies the state-specific waivers into five
categories: (1) those that require work, (2) those that impose time limits on benefits, (3) those that
provide work incentives (i.e., that “make work pay”), (4) those that are related to child support
enforcement, and (5) those that encourage parental responsibility (e.g., requirements that children in
AFDC families regularly attend school and get health checkups, or a so-called “family cap,” which does6
Moffitt (1996) has argued that certain types of work-requirement waivers could actually increase
6
caseloads by enticing some people to apply for AFDC in order to take advantage of the job training and job
placement assistance. While this is certainly a possibility, it is unlikely that this would result in a long-term increase.
In addition, other components of the work-requirement waivers, such as sanctions for failure to participate, could
offset this effect.
not allow benefits to increase when another child is born in a family receiving assistance). We adopt the
HHS classification with one modification—we combine waivers related to child support enforcement
with those encouraging parental responsibility. The waiver variables take on values of zero until the
month that the waiver is approved by HHS (not the month in which it was requested), at which time the
waiver is set equal to one. Each of the waivers, with the exception of making work more attractive, is
expected to reduce welfare caseloads.  Making work more attractive could actually lead to increased
6
caseloads because these waivers include provisions such as increasing the amount of income AFDC
recipients can earn without losing benefits. We also identify the states that implemented waivers
statewide separately from those that had experimental programs affecting only small portions of the state.
The effects of this distinction are addressed later in this paper. The Appendix contains details on the
coding of the waivers, along with the various approval dates.
Preliminary Data Investigation
We begin with an exploratory look at trends for a select group of states in per capita caseloads
and per capita employment before and after enactment of welfare reform. The four types of waivers are
highly correlated, so throughout this section we focus attention on states that received approval for work-
requirement waivers and compare them with states that did not receive such a waiver. Figure 1 plots state
per capita welfare caseload in September 1996 (the last period in our sample) against state per capita
welfare caseload in September 1992. The filled dots represent states that enacted a work-requirement
waiver during this period, and the empty circles represent states that did not enact such a waiver. Based
on a simple comparison of means, caseload changes across the two types of states do not appear muchState welfare caseloads in 1992 and 1996
states with and without work requirement
per capita caseload in September 1992

















































different. The mean decrease in caseloads in nonwaiver states was 12.4 percent, while the mean waiver-
state caseload decrease was 18 percent, but the difference is not statistically significant at conventional
levels. Nonetheless, there is some evidence of a relationship between caseload changes and welfare
waivers. Seven of the eight states in which caseloads fell the most are waiver states, but just four of the
nine states with caseload gains are waiver states.
We next consider the possibility that welfare waiver states have experienced more rapid
economic growth, on average, than have nonwaiver states. As a preliminary exploration of this
possibility, we plot in Figure 2 the per capita employment in September 1996 against per capita
employment in September 1992 for waiver states and nonwaiver states. Again, the difference is not
statistically significant; employment per capita in waiver states grew on average by 3.5 percent from
1992 to 1996, compared to a 3.2 percent growth in nonwaiver states.
The prior discussion suggests that only weak relationships exist between welfare waiver
imposition and recent changes in caseloads or employment. We do, however, observe large differences in
caseload reductions across the states and among each type of state.
For instance, caseload changes in waiver states range from a decrease of over 40 percent to an
increase of 22 percent over the 4-year period. Figure 3 suggests that a substantial determinant of caseload
reduction among all states, regardless of waiver status, is economic growth. Among both waiver and
nonwaiver states, the states whose economies grew the most also tended to have the largest caseload
reduction (this relationship is significant at about the 1 percent level, and is significant at the 8 percent
level when the two outlier states are eliminated). While the five waiver states with the smallest
employment growth saw caseloads decline by an average of 6 percent, the five waiver states with the
largest employment growth averaged a 22 percent decline in caseloads over the period in question.
Therefore, it appears that caseload reductions are a function more of employment growth than simply of
welfare reform.State employment in 1992 and 1996
states with and without work requirement
per capita employment in September 1992





















































Figure 2Percentage change in caseloads and employment
in states with and without work requirements
percentage change in employment











































Figure 3￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
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Preliminary models included 119 month dummy variables, the coefficients of which when plotted against
7
time suggest a cubic trend. We use the cubic trend rather than the month dummies to save on the number of
parameters to estimate. The early results were not sensitive to use of the trend as opposed to month dummies.
Failing to control for state-specific demographics, such as fertility rates, that likely affect welfare
8
caseloads may lead to an omitted variable bias if they are not captured by either the state fixed effects or state-
specific trends. The sensitivity section below suggests that omitting these variables does not affect our estimates of
either the business cycle or welfare waivers on caseloads.
We were initially concerned that a common set of month dummies for all states would not adequately
9
capture seasonal fluctuations in employment and caseloads. Hence, we tried a number of specifications in which
each state had its own unique set of month dummies. We found that these specifications yielded almost identical
results to those with a common set of month effects, so to conserve on the number of parameters to estimate, we
chose to use the more parsimonious specification.
(1)
Estimation Issues
To move beyond simple graphical correlations between economic growth, welfare waivers, and
AFDC caseloads, we estimate an econometric model to control for other possible determinants of
caseloads. To this end, we permit national economic and political trends to have an effect on AFDC
caseloads by specifying the trend as a cubic polynomial in time t (t = 1,..,120). This allows enough
nonlinearity in the trend to capture the fall (1987–1990), rise (1990–1993), and subsequent fall
(1993–1996) in aggregate caseloads over the sample period.  In addition, we control for both time-
7
invariant and time-varying state-specific effects; this captures not only fixed unobserved state-specific
propensities to take-up welfare but also slow-moving state-specific trends in demographics such as
fertility rates, marital status, and migration that are not available in monthly intervals.  Finally, because
8
our monthly measures of caseloads and economic growth are not seasonally adjusted, we append month-
of-year dummies to the empirical model to capture seasonal fluctuations in caseloads and employment.
9
The static model of AFDC caseloads for each state i (i = 1,..,51) in month t is thus
where C  is the natural log of per capita AFDC caseloads, E  is the measure of economic growth (natural it it
log of employment per capita or the unemployment rate), W  is the vector of welfare waivers, t is a trend, it￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿1 ˜ ￿￿1￿￿2￿￿3,￿2 ˜ ￿2￿2￿3￿3, ￿3 ˜ ￿3￿3
12
The dynamic fixed-effect model here is not likely to suffer from the so-called Nickell (1981) bias, that is,
10
the bias that arises from the correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the model’s error term. Nickell
shows that the bias goes to zero as T gets large, and because T = 120, the bias is expected to be ignorable.
(2)
￿ is the time-invariant state-specific effect, ￿t is the time-varying state-specific effect, ￿ (j = 2,...,12) is ii j
the month-of-year dummy variable, and ￿  is a random error that permits conditional heteroskedasticity in it
caseloads.
Since we are using data at the relatively high frequency of monthly intervals, nonstationarity in
AFDC caseloads is likely to be a problem. Indeed, preliminary estimates from a dynamic fixed-effect
regression model (not shown here) produced a coefficient on the lagged dependent variable of 0.98
(s.e.=0.005).  Consequently, we first-difference the regression model in equation (1) to make caseloads
10
difference stationary, yielding the first-difference estimating equation
where   and  . Notice that in equation (2) the time-invariant state
effects drop out of the model; however, the effect of state-specific trends is still captured by ￿, which we i
parameterize with 50 state (including the District of Columbia) dummy variables (Alabama is omitted for
identification). The coefficients on the welfare waivers (￿) now capture the short-run impact of welfare
reform and thus are likely to understate the actual effects of the waivers on caseloads. In the next section,
we suggest a method to capture the long-run impact of waivers (and, for that matter, of business cycles as
well) in a dynamic model of caseloads.
A key issue for model specification is the potential endogeneity of the welfare waivers. States
with high AFDC caseloads may be more likely to request federal welfare waivers, resulting in an
identification problem, since the direction of causality might go in both directions. This potential
endogeneity is highlighted by the surge in welfare-waiver requests occurring after the general 1990–1993
increase in caseloads. Fortunately, we believe that endogeneity is not a problem in our model. Even if13
We perform the analogous exercise with each of the other types of waivers and find virtually identical
11
results.
Similarly, the CEA (1997) finds that “waiver states did not experience a larger-than-average increase in
12
their welfare rolls between 1989 and 1993” (p.9).
In a further attempt to address the endogeneity of welfare waivers, we searched for variables that could be
13
used as instruments. The difficulty here is in the paucity of variables available on a monthly basis that might be
appropriate. We considered two annually observed variables, the time-adjusted “real” Americans for Democratic
Action (ADA) voting score for the degree of liberalness of the state’s Congressional representatives (constructed by
Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder (1996) and generously provided by Tim Groseclose) and the percentage of the
state’s Congressional representatives who are members of the Republican party. We estimated two instrumental-
variables regression models, one in which the two instruments are used along with the time-limit and work-pays
waivers, and one in which all four waivers are included. The latter model is identified by using the two instruments
along with interactions of the two instruments with employment per capita. Not surprisingly, these parameter
estimates were both distorted and highly inefficient because of the inconsistent frequency of observations between
regressors and instruments.
rising caseloads are the impetus for waiver requests, a lag may occur before such requests are made.
Therefore, waiver requests are not likely to be correlated with contemporaneous caseloads. In our case,
there is even less reason to be concerned because we define the existence of waivers on the basis of the
month that the waiver was granted by the federal government, not the month that the waiver was
requested. The time between request date and grant date ranges from as short as 2 weeks in the case of
the District of Columbia to over 2 years in the case of California, with the average length of delay being
around 1 year. Consequently, our measures of welfare waivers can be considered to be predetermined.
Despite the foregoing argument, we attempt to verify that waivers are not endogenous.
Specifically, we calculate the 1-year change in per capita caseloads in the year immediately preceding
waiver approval for each state that imposed a work requirement waiver and compare this with the 1-year
change in per capita caseloads during the same period for states that did not yet have such a waiver
approved.  We observe that the pre-waiver change in per capita caseloads is less than 0.4 percent
11
different from that in the states that had not yet imposed a welfare waiver. Moreover, this difference is
not statistically significant at any reasonable threshold.  Thus, we are convinced that our results are not
12
likely to be sensitive to the potential endogeneity of the welfare waivers.
1314
Unlike the studies by the CEA (1997) and Blank (1997b), our model does not include welfare
benefit levels as a regressor both because benefits vary only at an annual rate, as opposed to our monthly
data, and because of the lack of suitable instruments that could deal with the possible simultaneity with
caseloads. It is sensible to think that while benefit levels might explain welfare caseloads, the size of the
caseload might also affect the benefit level. Indeed, the simultaneity between welfare benefits and
recipiency has been shown by Shroder (1995) and Gramlich and Laren (1984), among others. But we
also have reason to believe that our omission of benefit levels does not affect our results in this paper.
While the CEA study shows that annual deviations from state trends in benefits and welfare recipiency
are significantly correlated, we find that annual changes in welfare benefits are almost completely
uncorrelated with monthly changes in welfare caseloads (the correlation is less than -0.01).
3. RESULTS
Table 1 presents ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates for four different specifications of
equation (2). The specifications differ in their treatment of the welfare waivers, and each model is
estimated twice, first with the log of employment per capita and then with the unemployment rate as the
measure of economic growth.
Full-State Waivers
Specification (1) contains the results for the static first-difference model where the only welfare
waivers modeled are those that apply statewide. The table reveals conflicting impacts of economic
growth on welfare caseloads. Employment per capita has no statistical effect on welfare caseloads, while
the unemployment rate has a significantly positive effect. It is not clear a priori why the unemployment
rate is a contemporaneously important determinant of AFDC caseloads but per capita employment is not.
One possibility is that movements in per capita employment capture populations that are less likely toTABLE 1
First-Difference Estimates of Business Cycles and State Welfare Waivers on State-Specific Monthly AFDC Caseloads†
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Employment/cap 2.925 2.943 2.904 2.938
(3.425) (3.424) (3.426) (3.425)
Unemployment rate 0.180*** 0.179*** 0.179*** 0.179***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
Work required -0.326 -0.328 -0.268 -0.276 -0.310 -0.319 -0.312 -0.314
(0.240) (0.238) (0.245) (0.243) (0.259) (0.257) (0.243) (0.243)
Time limit -0.513** -0.520** -0.122 -0.127 -0.437* -0.449* -0.427 -0.439
(0.253) (0.253) (0.236) (0.235) (0.259) (0.259) (0.263) (0.264)
Work pays 0.408* 0.394* 0.140 0.149 0.334 0.331 0.300 0.294
(0.225) (0.232) (0.246) (0.246) (0.259) (0.259) (0.259) (0.260)
Responsibility 0.098 0.129 -0.132 -0.102 0.017 0.051 0.118 0.149
(0.224) (0.227) (0.218) (0.219) (0.225) (0.227) (0.239) (0.243)
Partial-state work -0.163 -0.181 1.076 1.039
   requirement (0.255) (0.249) (1.381) (1.347)
Partial-state time limit 0.593 0.619 1.884 1.819
(0.416) (0.406) (1.862) (1.816)
Partial-state work pays -0.165 -0.120 -2.150 -2.019
(0.286) (0.285) (1.433) (1.425)
Partial-state responsibility -0.498 -0.495 -0.126 -0.088
(0.322) (0.326) (0.973) (0.953)
Adjusted R 0.226 0.228 0.226 0.227 0.226 0.227 0.226 0.227
2
† All coefficients are multiplied by 100. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each regression controls for a constant, a quadratic trend, 11 month-of-year
dummies, and 50 state dummies. The number of observations used in estimation equals 6,069 (N=51; T=119). Specification (1) only permits full-state waivers; specification
(2) makes no distinction between full- and partial-state waivers; specification (3) distinguishes full-state from partial-state waivers, giving equal weight to each partial-state
waiver; specification (4) gives unequal weight to partial-state waivers depending on the fraction of the state’s AFDC population covered by the waiver.
* = significant at the 10 percent level; ** = significant at the 5 percent level; *** = significant at the 1 percent level16
participate in welfare programs, while unemployment rates may better capture labor-market opportunities
of the poor. Another possibility, which is discussed further below, is that this model does not capture the
dynamics of the labor market.
Three of the four full-state welfare waivers have the expected qualitative impact on AFDC
caseloads, and two of the four waivers—time limits and making work pay—having a statistically
significant effect. Interestingly, though, these two policies have the effect of canceling each other out.
States with welfare time limits, but no other waiver, can expect about a 0.5 percent reduction in welfare
caseloads in the month the waiver is granted. On the contrary, states with a work-pays waiver, but no
other waiver, can expect a 0.4 percent increase in caseloads. Hence, states with both provisions, but not
work or responsibility requirements, are likely to see little change in AFDC caseloads. Combining all
four full-state welfare waivers, jointly significant at the 8 percent level using a Wald test, yields about a
0.34 percent short-run reduction in AFDC caseloads.
Full- and Partial-State Waivers
In specifications (2)–(4) in Table 1, we extend our analysis to include the impact of waivers that
affected only a portion of caseloads in a state. In specification (2), we make no distinction between full-
and partial-state waivers and note that the cumulative impact of all four welfare waivers is comparable to
specification (1); that is, states with all four waivers can expect about a 0.39 percent short-run reduction
in caseloads. However, none of the waiver coefficients are statistically significant, suggesting that a more
appropriate approach is one that permits the full-state and partial-state waivers to have independent
influences on caseloads.
Specifications (3) and (4) report results from models that separately identify full- and partial-
state waivers, where specification (3) gives equal weight to each partial-state waiver and (4) gives
unequal weight to partial-state waivers depending on the fraction of the state’s AFDC population covered
by each waiver. It is clear from model (3) that the statistically zero results for time limits and work pays￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
17
(3)
in model (2) are due to the offsetting positive and negative effects of the corresponding partial-state time-
limit and work-pays waivers. The results from the unequal weight model in specification (4) are less
clear as the partial-state waivers yield untenable coefficients, possibly due to the fact that our weighting
scheme is time-invariant whereas welfare populations are likely changing over time in these
demonstration counties. However, regardless of whether the partial-state waivers are given equal or
unequal weight, they do not significantly affect per capita AFDC caseloads; hence, in the remainder of
the analysis we restrict attention to full-state waivers alone.
Dynamic Determination of Welfare Caseloads
Although the impact of economic growth on AFDC caseloads is robust across the four
specifications in Table 1, a remaining puzzle is the inconsistent impact of the business cycle on caseloads
depending on whether the cycle is measured by employment per capita or the unemployment rate. In this
section we explore the possibility that this inconsistency might arise from misspecified business-cycle
dynamics.
In Table 2 we offer a preliminary look at business-cycle dynamics by replacing equation (1) with
where ￿  is the long-run effect of the business cycle on caseloads and ￿  is the short-run effect. As 1 2
before, we estimate equation (3) in first differences. The two models in Table 2 are now more
harmonious in that a clear long-run effect of the business cycle is identified in both the employment per
capita and unemployment rate specifications; however, only the unemployment rate reveals a short-run
effect. In the long-run, a 1 percent increase in monthly employment per capita leads to a 0.186 percent
reduction in monthly AFDC caseloads; in contrast, a 1 percentage point decrease in the monthly
unemployment rate leads to a 0.6 percent reduction in monthly caseloads. Evaluated at the mean of 5.82
percent, a 1 percentage point decrease in the unemployment rate is a 17 percent reduction in the18
TABLE 2
Estimates of Short-Run and Long-Run Business Cycles and Full-State Welfare Waivers on







Unemployment rate (t-1) 0.604***
(0.073)
Work requirement -0.332 -0.344
(0.223) (0.226)
Time limit -0.483* -0.566**
(0.249) (0.248)




Adjusted R 0.241 0.239
2
† All coefficients are multiplied by 100. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Each regression controls for a constant, a quadratic trend, 11 month-of-year dummies, and 50 state
dummies. The number of observations used in estimation equals 6,069 (N=51; T=119).
* = significant at the 10 percent level; ** = significant at the 5 percent level; *** = significant at the 1
percent level.19
Thanks to David Card for suggesting this idea. Including months since approval allows the effect of
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waivers to grow continually over time, which is unrealistic. However, we do not wish to arbitrarily impose a limit on
the length of the implementation lag, so we do not restrict this variable. Since most of the waivers have been in
effect for a relatively short time, we do not believe that this poses a problem. However, to the extent that we do not
cap the time horizon for phase-in when we should, we are likely to overstate the effects of the welfare waivers.
unemployment rate, indicating that a 1 percent decrease in the unemployment rate leads to a 0.102
percent reduction in monthly AFDC caseloads. This suggests that employment per capita has a larger
long-run effect on caseloads than does the unemployment rate. The impacts of full-state welfare waivers,
meanwhile, are largely unchanged from specification (1) in Table 1; namely, the effects of time-limit and
work-pays waivers are largely offsetting, and the cumulative effect of all four waivers is for a 0.3 percent
reduction in AFDC caseloads.
The dynamic model in Table 2 is limiting in several respects. First, it forces the long-run
business-cycle effect into a single coefficient when in fact there may be a more interesting pattern of
dynamics across several periods. Second, the model ignores the possibility that even after controlling for
heterogeneity in the form of state-specific fixed and time-varying effects, previous AFDC caseloads may
have a direct impact on future caseloads, i.e., caseloads may sluggishly adjust to changing economic and
political conditions. Finally, the models thus far have ignored any dynamic impact of welfare waivers. In
most cases, a lag occurs between the point at which a welfare waiver is approved and the time at which it
is actually implemented. Since this lag has not been incorporated in our previous models, the estimated
effect of the welfare waivers presented so far is probably biased downward.
We address these problems in the model presented in Table 3. This table contains the OLS
results from a more fully dynamic model of welfare caseloads, which captures state-dependence of
caseloads by including lagged values of the dependent variable. It also captures the short-run and long-
run business-cycle effects by including lags of employment per capita, and the implementation lag in the
waivers by appending variables indicating the number of months since the waiver has been approved.
14
The lag lengths on caseloads and employment per capita were determined by iteratively estimating the20
TABLE 3
Dynamic Business-Cycle and Welfare-Waiver Effects on
State-Specific Monthly AFDC Caseloads
Caseloads (t-1) -12.953*** Employment/Cap (t-7) -0.255
Caseloads (t-2) 9.109*** Employment/Cap (t-8) 6.181**
Caseloads (t-3) 12.869*** Employment/Cap (t-9) 6.139**
Caseloads (t-4) -1.053 Employment/Cap (t-10) -0.527
Caseloads (t-5) 2.100 Employment/Cap (t-11) -6.862***
Caseloads (t-6) 3.262* Work required -0.475**
Employment/Cap 1.049*** Time limit -0.431*
Employment/Cap (t-1) -20.613*** Work pays 0.524**
Employment/Cap (t-2) -24.469*** Responsibility 0.148
Employment/Cap (t-3) -8.892*** Work required: months -0.010**
Employment/Cap (t-4) -0.629 Time limit: months since -0.001
Employment/Cap (t-5) -9.555*** Work pays: months since 0.020***










(2.778) since implemented (0.004)
(2.465) implemented (0.006)
(2.846) implemented (0.005)
(2.623) since implemented (0.004)
† All coefficients are multiplied by 100. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
Each regression controls for a constant, a quadratic trend, 11 month-of-year dummies, and 50 state 
dummies. The number of observations used in estimation equals 5,508 (N=51; T=108).
* = significant at the 10 percent level; ** = significant at the 5 percent level; *** = significant at 
the 1 percent level21
The model presented in Table 2 shows that the two economic variables are comparable in their long-run
15
effects of the cycle. Although the results are not shown here, estimates of models using the unemployment rate yield
results comparable to those presented in Table 3.
model with additional lags until the two most recently added consecutive lags were statistically
insignificant. While we estimated this model using both the unemployment rate and employment per
capita, we focus on the latter because it did not appear to have any effect in the first model estimated. In
this way, we are giving as much credit as possible to the welfare waivers.
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It is clear from Table 3 that monthly state-specific caseloads show a rich dynamic structure, with
caseloads having six lags and employment per capita having eleven lags. Moreover, the welfare waivers
have both short-run and long-run effects on AFDC caseloads, and each has the expected qualitative
impact. Three of the four waivers have statistically significant short-run effects and implementation lags.
Because it is difficult to disentangle the independent influence of each regressor on per capita caseloads,
we next summarize the relative impacts of economic growth and welfare reform with model simulations
of Table 3 for specific states.
Dynamic Simulations
The dynamic model described above is sufficiently complex that it is difficult to envision the
effects of the business cycle or welfare reforms by direct observation of the parameter estimates. For
instance, short-run changes in caseloads associated with welfare reforms or employment growth also
independently feed into future levels of welfare caseloads, suggesting a complicated dynamic structure to
the caseload series. However, for ease of interpretation, we can use the parameter estimates derived from
the dynamic model described above to simulate the effects of business cycles and welfare reforms over
time. To carry out these simulations, we use actual past caseload (derived using the model after January
1988) and per capita employment data for each state from January 1988 to the present as starting values.22
We then use the parameter estimates to “implement” welfare waivers in the actual months in which they
were approved.
We first use actual employment series from Oregon and Wisconsin to simulate the effects of
each type of welfare reform (versus no reform) over time for a reform implemented in January 1993. We
select Oregon and Wisconsin because these are the two states with the largest reductions in caseloads per
capita since January 1993—43 percent and 48 percent reductions, respectively. These simulations are
shown in Figures 4 and 5, in which the y-axis variable is the logarithm of per capita caseloads. Our model
suggests that in the absence of welfare reform, the cyclical and seasonal fluctuations in employment that
occurred since January 1993 in Oregon and Wisconsin would have led respectively to 23 percent and 25
percent caseload reductions by September 1996. Work-requirement and responsibility waivers would
each be associated with about an 11 percent reduction in caseloads, and time-limit waivers would be
associated with about a 2 percent caseload reduction by September 1996. Work-pays waivers, however,
are associated with about a 22 percent increase in welfare caseload by September 1996. Therefore, our
model suggests substantial reductions over time in welfare caseloads if work-requirement, responsibility,
or (less so) time-limit waivers are introduced, but these effects are offset (perhaps completely—or more)
if work-pays waivers are also implemented. However, our results suggest that a substantial fraction of
caseload reduction in Oregon and Wisconsin would have occurred even without welfare reform.
Table 4 presents the actual caseload reductions, the percentage of these reductions attributable
(by our model) to welfare reform, and the percentage of these reductions that we attribute to cyclical and
seasonal economic fluctuations for each of the 20 states with the largest caseload reductions since
January 1993. We observe that in only three of these states (Wisconsin, Oregon, and Oklahoma) does
welfare reform explain more than 5 percent of the state’s caseload reduction, while invariably cyclical
and seasonal economic fluctuations explain at least 50 percent of the reductions (and usually muchPredicted effects of a Jan 93 welfare waiver


























































Figure 4Predicted effects of a Jan 93 welfare waiver




























































Percentage of Caseload Reduction Explained by Welfare Reform and Economic
Growth in the Twenty States with the Largest Caseload Reductions, 1993–1996†
Percent Change Percent Explained
in Caseload, Percent Explained by Cyclical and
State Jan 1993 to Sep 1996 by Welfare Reform Seasonal Fluctuations
Wisconsin -48% 11% 53%
Oregon -43 33 55
Wyoming -43 0 55
Indiana -36 1 71
Oklahoma -36 12 61
North Dakota -35 4 77
Utah -35 -3 70
Louisiana -33 2 67
Michigan -32 -1 72
Massachusetts -32 -1 72
Colorado -31 0 78
Mississippi -31 2 76
Florida -30 0 75
Alabama -26 0 92
Ohio -25 -1 89
South Dakota -25 -4 100
Kansas -24 -1 82
North Carolina -24 1 87
South Carolina -23 1 91
Arizona -22 -6 124
† A negative sign in the second column implies that the welfare reforms in the state are associated with
an increase in welfare caseloads, while numbers in excess of 100 in the last column indicate that our
model overpredicts caseloads in that particular state.26
Oregon’s time-limit waiver is less restrictive than most, however. The state does not even start counting
16
time on AFDC unless a recipient fails to participate in required work activities, so we probably modestly overstate
the fraction of Oregon’s welfare caseload reduction attributable to welfare waivers.
It should be noted that three states with meaningful caseload reductions that are not on this list also had
17
welfare reforms that explain a substantial fraction (over 10 percent) of the caseload reduction. Arkansas’s,
Georgia’s, and Maryland’s welfare waivers each explain at least 15 percent of their caseload declines, according to
our results. Arkansas and Maryland have relatively old responsibility policies. Georgia has relatively old
responsibility and work-requirement policies, and only a recent work-pays policy.
more). Therefore, it appears that with only a few exceptions, welfare reform does not explain a
substantial fraction of the caseload reduction that had occurred up to September 1996.
What is special about Oregon, Wisconsin, and Oklahoma, the three states among this group
where welfare reform does explain a substantial fraction of the reduction in caseloads? (Note, however,
that seasonal and cyclical economic fluctuations still explain a higher percentage of the caseload change
in these states than does welfare reform!) All three states received relatively early welfare waivers,
giving the waivers sufficient time for the implementation effect to occur. But many other states obtained
waivers at about the same time, so the timing of the waivers cannot be the sole answer. More important
may be the types of waivers implemented. Wisconsin implemented statewide work-requirement and
responsibility waivers, but no statewide work-pays waiver. Oregon had early work-requirement and
responsibility waivers, and only 6 months before the sample ended did Oregon receive a work-pays
waiver. However, at the same time, Oregon implemented a time-limit waiver, thereby mitigating the pro-
caseload effect of the work-pays waiver.  Oklahoma implemented all four types of waivers but has one
16
of the first responsibility waivers. In most other states, anti-caseload waivers were coupled with work-
pays waivers, leading us to attribute to welfare reform only a small fraction of the state welfare caseload
reductions observed recently, and in some cases we predict that welfare reform alone would actually have
led to slightly increased welfare caseloads (note, for instance, the negative percentages explained in
states such as Arizona and Utah). Therefore, we can conclude that in the vast majority of states, much
more of the decline in caseloads can be attributed to economic growth than to welfare reform.
1727
Differences in coding the states’ welfare waivers arise from two sources: different sources of information
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and a slightly different classification of waiver types. The CEA excluded two states’ waivers that were approved by
HHS but never implemented by the states, based on information not found in the publicly available HHS document
on waivers. In addition, we chose to follow the HHS classification by type of waiver, which is more inclusive than
Wisconsin’s welfare reforms are arguably more stringent than other similarly categorized
reforms. It is possible, therefore, that we are understating the effects of welfare reform in Wisconsin and
overstating the effects in other states whose welfare reforms fall into the same categories as Wisconsin’s.
In an attempt to gauge the degree to which this is the case, we estimate our dynamic model with five sets
of policy variables—the four types of welfare waivers mentioned above, plus separate Wisconsin-
specific policies. Our Wisconsin-specific variables suggest that Wisconsin’s welfare reforms may be
associated with as much as a 16 percent caseload reduction to date (one-third of the total Wisconsin
caseload reduction), larger than our previous estimate but still considerably lower than the estimated
contribution of economic growth. The other policy effects are roughly similar to those presented above,
suggesting that our previously mentioned results are not driven by Wisconsin.
4. DISCUSSION: RECONCILING WITH THE CEA
The CEA’s results that welfare waivers account for a sizeable fraction of the decline in AFDC
caseloads have been cited by President Clinton and a number of governors in policy speeches about the
effectiveness of welfare reform. However, the results, and consequent policy implications, of our study
differ markedly from those in the much-publicized CEA study (and to a lesser extent from Blank
(1997b)). Specifically, the CEA attributes nearly a five-fold larger effect of welfare waivers on
explaining the recent caseload decline than do we, and a business-cycle effect that is about 40 percent
less. An obvious question arises about the source of this discrepancy; that is, is it due to our different
coding of the waiver variables, our omission of measured demographics and lead effects, or our use of a
dynamic model with monthly as opposed to annual data.  In this section, we provide evidence that the
1828
that used in the CEA report. See the Appendix for further details.
latter is at the root of our difference with the CEA. We argue that the CEA’s (and Blank’s (1997b)) use
of annual data masks both important short-run dynamics in AFDC caseloads and implementation lags in
welfare waivers that are more adequately modeled with monthly data.
To begin, we attempt to replicate the results of the CEA (1997) and Blank (1997b) using our data
and waiver coding by annualizing our monthly data to give us 10 years of data for each of the 50 states
plus the District of Columbia. We follow the CEA and aggregate our four full-state waiver variables into
a single variable, “any statewide waiver.” The waiver variable now represents the fraction of a year that a
waiver is in effect. Each model below measures the business cycle with the unemployment rate and
controls both for state fixed effects and year dummies, yielding a specification that is comparable to the
CEA’s (1997) Table 1, column (1), and Blank’s (1997b) Table 2, column (1).
In column (1) of Table 5, we report the least squares results of the base-case annualized model.
The estimates of 4.07 for unemployment and -9.06 for the waiver are highly comparable to the CEA’s
estimates of 4.73 and -9.40, and with Blank’s estimates of 4.40 and -10.60. Because we are able to
replicate their findings using our data and coding methodology, this suggests that (1) the differences in
our results are not due to differences in coding of the waivers and (2) the coefficients on our variables of
interest, the business cycle and waiver variables, are not likely to suffer from an omitted variables bias.
Although Blank controls for several measured demographics—such as the median wage, the fraction of
single female household heads in the population, average education, and the AFDC benefit level—our
results excluding those variables are indistinguishable from those that include them.
Another source of the difference between our results and the CEA’s is their control for a
potential lead effect in waivers, namely, the potential for “political rational expectations” signifying that
welfare reform is on the horizon. In column (2) we report results of models with lead effects, with
additional controls for lagged unemployment. The latter specification yields a significant lead effect inTABLE 5
Annual Models of the Effect of the Business Cycle and Welfare Waivers on AFDC Caseloads†
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Unemployment rate 4.074*** 1.359** 1.888*** 0.662** 0.676** 0.643** 0.643*
(0.505) (0.679) (0.334) (0.338) (0.340) (0.330) (0.336)
Lagged unemployment rate 3.286*** 0.368
(0.669) (0.307)
Any statewide waiver -9.058*** -2.046 1.493 0.770 0.576
(1.811) (2.295) (1.110) (.1877) (1.878)
Lead statewide waiver -7.008*** -2.446*** -1.882** -1.522
(2.000) (0.834) (0.868) (0.978)




Work required -4.440* -4.007
(2.676) (2.574)
Time limit 0.884 0.499
(3.642) (3.730)




(table continues)TABLE 5, continued
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Lead work required 0.506 0.114
(1.461) (1.774)
Lead time limit 0.073 0.016
(1.519) (1.553)
Lead work pays -1.951 -1.702
(1.281) (1.522)
Lead responsibility -1.452 -1.296
(1.020) (1.086)
Work required: years -0.609
since implemented (0.835)
Time limit: years 0.529
since implemented (0.996)




† Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. The number of observations used in estimation equals 510 (N=51; T=10). Columns
(1)–(3) are estimated in levels, while columns (4)–(7) are estimated in first differences. Each model controls for state-specific effects and year
effects.
* = significant at the 10 percent level; ** = significant at the 5 percent level; *** = significant at the 1 percent level.31
waivers, comparable in magnitude to the CEA results. This suggests that our dynamic monthly model (in
Table 3) may not be picking up potential lead effects in waivers, so we test this by examining how the
CEA’s model stands up to some of our modeling choices.
In column (3) of Table 5, we augment the model in column (2) with a lagged dependent variable.
We showed previously that significant state dependence exists in monthly caseloads, and thus may also
exist in annual caseloads. The estimate of 0.83 with a t-statistic of 36 indicates that the CEA and Blank
are not adequately capturing the model dynamics and that there may be a nonstationarity in annual
caseload levels. While this is not a direct test for a unit root, our estimate of 0.83 is likely downward-
biased. Nickell (1981) showed that when T is small (T=10, 16, and 20 in this model, Blank’s, and the
CEA’s, respectively), the downward bias can be as large as 16 percent, suggesting that the true estimate
may be closer to 0.95. Consequently, it is probably more appropriate to estimate the annual model in first
differences to make caseloads difference stationary. In column (4) we report the results of a first-
difference regression, where we have dropped lagged unemployment because the waiver variables were
not significantly affected by their inclusion. It is clear that even in the first-difference model, significant
waiver lead effects still exist.
However, missing from each of the first four models in Table 5, and in the CEA’s and Blank’s
papers, is a control for the likely existence of significant lags between the time a waiver is approved and
the time it is actually implemented. We construct an annualized analogue of our implementation lag,
defined as the fraction of years since waiver approval, and append it to the model in column (4). The
results are recorded in column (5), where we no longer find a significant lead effect, nor do we find a
significant implementation effect, contrary to our monthly results in Table 3. We further examine the
robustness of the lead effect by disaggregating the waiver variables into the four categories used
previously: work requirements, time limits, work pays, and responsibility. In columns (6) and (7) we
report the disaggregated waiver models without and with implementation lags and find that the only32
significant waiver effects are contemporaneous. Since our previous results with monthly data yield
significant implementation effects, we conclude that the CEA’s use of annual data not only misses
important short-run dynamics in caseloads induced by business-cycle factors and state dependence, but
also does not adequately capture the implementation lag in welfare waivers, resulting in an overstatement
of the effects of welfare reform.
5. CONCLUSIONS
We account for the recent decline in AFDC caseloads using a dynamic model in which we permit
a rich structure of lagged caseloads, lagged employment per capita, and implementation lags in federal
welfare waivers. Our results suggest that the decline in per capita AFDC caseloads is attributable largely
to the economic growth of states and not to waivers from federal welfare policies. Twenty-six states
experienced declines in per capita AFDC caseloads of 20 percent or more over the 1993–1996 period.
We attribute almost 80 percent of the decline in those states to economic growth and about 6 percent to
the states’ experiments with welfare reform under federal waivers. However, our results also suggest that
two aspects of the welfare waivers may have substantial effects on AFDC caseloads. Specifically, the
form of the welfare waiver matters: most states that experienced small changes in welfare caseloads
attributable to welfare reform have work-pays provisions in their waivers, which our model predicts will
increase AFDC caseloads. In addition, our results indicate that the effects of welfare waiver
implementation are not immediate, but rather phase in over months or even years.
Hence, while our results strongly indicate that welfare reform has to date played only a modest
role in the aggregate reduction of AFDC caseloads, we suspect that the recent round of waivers, as well
as the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, may lead to larger
caseload reductions in the future. Nonetheless, when a recession next occurs, the slowdown in33
employment growth may more than offset the impacts of welfare reform, and caseloads are likely to rise
again.3435
Appendix: State-Specific Welfare Waivers
Prior to passage of the new welfare law in August 1996, states were required to seek HHS
approval to waive or change certain provisions of the federal laws governing the AFDC program. The
types of waivers approved have varied over time, with waivers becoming increasingly large-scale and
complex by the mid-1990s. Many states adopted partial-state waivers first, and later received approval
for waivers covering the entire state. While early waivers tended to include relatively few provisions,
some later waivers have represented complete overhauls of a state’s welfare system (Boehnen and
Corbett, 1996).
We rely primarily on information from the HHS Web site for the approval dates and types of
waivers in each state (HHS, 1996a). In some cases, we supplement this information with other sources
(HHS, 1996b; Wiseman, 1993a, 1993b; and CLASP, 1992). HHS classifies the state-specific welfare
waivers into five categories: (1) waivers regarding work requirements, (2) waivers imposing time limits
on assistance, (3) provisions “making work pay” (i.e., work incentives), (4) waivers regarding child
support enforcement, and (5) waivers encouraging parental responsibility. We adopt the HHS
classification with one modification; we combine waivers related to child support enforcement with those
encouraging parental responsibility. Table A-1 shows our coding of the state-specific waivers approved
by HHS between 1988 and 1996, based on the four categories.
Our coding of welfare waivers based on the HHS classifications differs slightly from the coding
scheme used by the CEA (1997). That report separates the two types of time limits, those that require
work after a set time period and those that impose an end to benefits after a time limit regardless of
whether the parent is employed. In our coding based on HHS, most JOBS waivers (as coded in the CEA
report) are counted as work-requirement waivers, and earnings-disregards changes are included in the
work-incentives (“making work pay”) category. We include more types of waivers, however, because the36
We included waivers in two states that received HHS approval but never implemented the reforms,
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according to information the CEA obtained that was not in the HHS Web site document. Excluding these two states
does not qualitatively affect our results.
CEA coding does not include most types of parental-responsibility waivers (other than a family cap) or
work requirements other than a time limit and JOBS-related sanctions policies, nor does the CEA include
extensions of transitional child care or medical benefits. Despite the fact that the CEA’s coding is less
inclusive than ours, as shown by our sensitivity analysis, differences in coding the waiver variables do
not explain the difference in results.
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Table A-2 identifies the key provisions that may be included in each type of waiver (based on the
HHS classification). Not all states include all these provisions in each waiver. There is some room for
judgment in classifying the waivers, because the categories are not as clear-cut as they may appear and
some categories overlap. Work-requirement waivers, for example, include provisions that sanction
participants for not seeking employment but also include waivers that subsidize private sector
employment or allow employers to contribute to special savings accounts for education and training.
Time limits primarily include restrictions on the length of time a family may receive benefits but may
also include a requirement that the parent find employment after a certain length of time on AFDC. Work
incentives, or provisions for making work pay, vary from extensions of transitional medical or child care
benefits to changes in earnings-disregards formulas to allow working recipients to keep a larger fraction
of their benefits as they increase their earnings. The impact of waivers is likely to vary depending on the
types and number of provisions adopted by each state.37
TABLE A-1
Federal Welfare Waivers in the States (Approval Date)
a
State Requirements Time Limits Work Incentives and Responsibility
Work Child Support
Alabama no no no no
A l a s k a n on on o n o
Arizona May 1995* May 1995 May 1995 May 1995
Arkansas no no no Apr 1994
California Sep 1995 no Mar 1994 Mar 1994
Colorado no Jan 1994* Jan 1994* Jan 1994*
Connecticut Dec 1995 Aug 1994* Aug 1994 Aug 1994*
Dec 1995 Dec 1995
Delaware May 1995 May 1995 May 1995 May 1995
District of no no no Aug 1996
Columbia
b
Florida Jan 1994* Jan 1994* Jan 1994* Jan 1994*
Jun 1996
Georgia Nov 1993 Oct 1995* Oct 1995 Nov 1992
Hawaii June 1994 Aug 1996 Aug 1996 Aug 1996
Idaho Aug 1996 no no Aug 1996
Illinois Oct 1995 Oct 1995 Nov 1993 Oct 1995
Indiana Dec 1994 Dec 1994 Dec 1994 Dec 1994
Iowa Apr 1996 Aug 1993 Aug 1993 Apr 1996
Kansas Aug 1996 no Aug 1996 Aug 1996
Kentucky no no no no
Louisiana no Feb 1996 no Feb 1996
Maine Jun 1996 no Jun 1996 June 1996
Maryland Aug 1995* Aug 1995* Aug 1995* Jun 1992
Aug 1996 Aug 1996 Aug 1996
Massachusetts Aug 1995 no Aug 1995 Aug 1995
Michigan Aug 1992 no Aug 1992  Aug 1992
Minnesota Apr 1994* no Apr 1994*
Aug 1996
Mississippi Dec 1994* no Dec 1994* Dec 1994*
Sep 1995
Missouri Oct 1992*
Apr 1995 Apr 1995 Apr 1995 Apr 1995
Montana Apr 1995 Apr 1995 Apr 1995 Apr 1995
Nebraska Feb 1995 Feb 1995 Feb 1995 Feb 1995
Nevada no no no no
New Hampshire Jun 1996 Jun 1996 Jun 1996 Jun 1996
New Jersey Jul 1992 no Jul 1992 Jul 1992
New Mexico no no no no
New York no no Oct 1988* Oct 1988*
Oct 1994* Oct 1994*
North Carolina Feb 1996 Feb 1996 Feb 1996 Feb 1996
North Dakota Apr 1994 Sep 1995* Sep 1995* Sep 1995*
(table continues)38
TABLE A-1, continued
State Requirements Time Limits Work Incentives and Responsibility
Work Child Support
Ohio Mar 1995* Mar 1995* Mar 1995*
Mar 1996 Mar 1996 Sep 1995 Sep 1995
Oklahoma Mar 1995* Mar 1995* Mar 1995* Jan 1994
Oregon Jul 1992 Mar 1996 Mar 1996 Mar 1996
Pennsylvania no no Nov 1994* Nov 1994*
Rhode Island no no no no
South Carolina Jan 1995* Jan 1995* Jan 1995*  Jan 1995*
May 1996 May 1996 May 1996 May 1996
South Dakota Mar 1994 Mar 1994 Mar 1994 no
Tennessee Jul 1996 Jul 1996 Jul 1996* Jul 1996
Texas Mar 1996 Mar 1996 Mar 1996 Jul 1995
Utah Oct 1992* no Oct 1992* Oct 1992*
Jul 1995 Jul 1995 Jul 1996
Vermont Apr 1993 Apr 1993 Apr 1993 Apr 1993
Virginia Nov 1993 Jul 1992*
Jul 1995 Jul 1995 Jul 1995
Washington no Sep 1995 Sep 1995 no
West Virginia Jul 1995 no Jul 1995 no
Wisconsin Nov 1993* Nov 1993* Apr 1992* Apr 1992*
Sep 1995 Jun 1994
Wyoming Sep 1993 no Sep 1993 Sep 1993
We exclude waivers that impacted only the AFDC-UP program, which in most cases lessened or
a
eliminated requirements concerning the 100-hour rule or work history requirements for eligibility. These
provisions affected only those families eligible for the unemployed parent program, a small fraction of
the caseload, and were more likely to increase than decrease caseloads. In some cases, states have
approval for later waivers, but these are not shown in the table if the new waiver expanded provisions
within categories already covered.
The District of Columbia withdrew its other waiver provisions in September 1996, prior to
b
implementation.
*Denotes provisions implemented in only part of a state.39
TABLE A-2
Examples of Waiver Provisions
Requiring work
￿ narrowing of criteria for exemptions from JOBS participation
￿ sanctions for failure to work or participate in a training program
￿ require community service work in exchange for benefits (“workfare”)
￿ expand job search requirements
￿ expand case management services
￿ wage subsidies in private sector jobs




￿ time limit on receiving benefits
￿ requirement to work or participate in training after a specified time period
￿ develop/sign a self-sufficiency plan or agreement with goals and deadlines
￿ sanctions to enforce self-sufficiency agreements
Making work pay (work incentives)
￿ increase resource limits
￿ increase earned income disregards
￿ extend transitional child care and/or medical benefits
￿ one-time payment in lieu of AFDC
￿ disregard earnings of teens in the household
Encourage parental responsibility and child support enforcement
￿ expand child support enforcement programs
￿ increase child support pass-through
￿ minor parents required to live at home or in a supervised setting
￿ teen parents required to attend school
￿ children required to attend school, be immunized, get health check-ups
￿ no increase in benefits if another child is born (a “family cap”)
Source: “HHS Fact Sheet: State Welfare Demonstrations.” U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services. August 22, 1996.4041
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